Maurice Baslé : “Créer aujourd’hui du service public en France passe par un meilleur service public de la donnée.”
Un article de Maurice Baslé, professeur émérite des universités (laboratoire Crem-CNRS-université Rennes-I), est disponible sur acteurspublics.com. A l’ère du Big Data, l’article montre l’importance de la formation initiale et continue des fonctionnaires.
Authors: Josselin, Jean-Michel, Le Maux, Benoît
This book provides a self-contained presentation of the statistical tools required for evaluating public programs, as advocated by many governments, the World Bank, the European Union, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. After introducing the methodological framework of program evaluation, the first chapters are devoted to the collection, elementary description and multivariate analysis of data as well as the estimation of welfare changes. The book then successively presents the tools of ex-ante methods (financial analysis, budget planning, cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness and multi-criteria evaluation) and ex-post methods (benchmarking, experimental and quasi-experimental evaluation). The step-by-step approach and the systematic use of numerical illustrations equip readers to handle the statistics of program evaluation.
It not only offers practitioners from public administrations, consultancy firms and nongovernmental organizations the basic tools and advanced techniques used in program assessment, it is also suitable for executive management training, upper undergraduate and graduate courses, as well as for self-study.
Due: June 15, 2017
Jean-Michel Josselin, membre du Condorcet center, a participé au séminaire “Modélisation et suivi en vie réelle” à l’Institut du Cerveau et la Moelle Epinière. Il a présenté les principales méthodes de correction des biais observationnels dans les études en vie réelle (différences de différences, méthodes d’appariement, régressions en discontinuité, variables instrumentales). Les études en vie réelle regroupent les expérimentations n’ayant pas fait l’objet d’une randomisation et qui de ce fait peuvent comporter des biais substantiels. La correction de ces biais exige des méthodes spécifiques et constitue un enjeu majeur des politiques d’évaluation.
New working paper: Ideology and Public Policies : A Quasi-Experimental Test of the Hypothesis that Left-Wing Governments Spend More
A new working paper of the Condorcet Center is avalaible HERE. Authors:
- Benoît LE MAUX – CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center for Political Economy, France
- Kristýna DOSTÁLOVÁ – University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS, France
- Fabio PADOVANO – CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center for Political Economy, France
ABSTRACT: In the literature it is often argued that governments on the left tend to raise tax rates and public spending more than their right-wing counterparts. We demonstrate that this result must be interpreted with caution. Not only it may reveal partisan effects, due to the direct impact of parties’ ideology on public spending, but also a selection bias, since the distribution of voters’ preferences determines the ideology of the government in office. The present research overcomes this problem of observational equivalence by applying two identification strategies, namely re-gression discontinuity design and propensity score matching. Using data from the French local public sector, we show that governments facing the same economic situation do not spend more when they are left-wing, particularly in the case of social expenditures. This result rules out the partisan-politicians hypothesis and lends support to demand driven policy selection processes.
A new working paper of the Condorcet Center is avalaible HERE.
- Benoît LE MAUX – CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France
- Sarah NECKER – University of Freiburg, Walter-Eucken Institute, Deutschland
- Yvon ROCABOY – CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France
We develop a theory of the evolution of scientific misbehavior. Our empirical analysis of a survey of scientific misbehavior in economics suggests that researchers’ disutility from cheating varies with the expected fraction of colleagues who cheat. This observation is central to our theory. We develop a one-principal multi-agent framework in which a research institution aims to reward scientific productivity at minimum cost. As the social norm is determined endogenously, performance-related pay may not only increase cheating in the short run but can also make cheat-ing increasingly attractive in the long run. The optimal contract thus depends on the dynamics of scientific norms. The premium on scientific productivity should be higher when the transmission of scientific norms across generations is lower (low marginal peer pressure) or the principal cares little about the future (has a high discount rate). Under certain conditions, a greater probability of detection also increases the optimal productivity premium.